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‘Who is Using Whom?’ Clientelism from the Client’s Perspective 
 
In Mexico City, the poor want for nutritious foods, employment, decent housing, education, 
health care and urban services such as sewage, electricity, running water and transportation.i As 
much as these resources should be accessible universally, the reality is that the city’s government 
is unable to finance goods and services for all residents and that its formal market does not 
provide enough jobs. Many citizens must thus choose between going without much-needed 
resources and using personal relationships with local politicians, operators and social leaders to 
obtain housing, services and work. Under these circumstances, the poor tend to consider patron-
client exchanges a strategic mechanism for achieving physical and economic security. Some 
researchers highlight the importance of this strategic tool for basic needs fulfilment, while others 
focus on the negative consequences that the discretionary public resource distribution involved 
has for democratic institutions. While my evidence supports both of these conclusions, it also 
suggests that some clients learn important citizenship responsibilities in their interactions with 
patrons. 
 
I examine perceptions of clientelism from the position of civil society members who have come 
in contact with it and consider how they see the politicians (and their parties) involved in 
clientelism, as well as how clientelism affects clients’ community and political participation. The 
findings presented here form part of a larger research project on clientelism in Mexico and 
within the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD), based 
on fieldwork undertaken in the summers of 2002 and 2003 and from August to December of 
2004. I engaged in formal, unstructured interviews with 81 patrons, clients and politicians and 
observed a series of community and party meetings. I targeted groups and individuals based on a 
maximum variation goal, identification of key players in party documents and newspapers, as 
well as opportunistic sampling and snowballing. Given the focus of the larger project, the 
information discussed here comes largely from individuals associated in some way with the 
PRD. With the exception of those presented in the case on the Partido del Trabajo (Workers’ 
Party, PT), the individuals either have direct exchange relations with PRD politicians or their 
representatives, or have exchange relations with the leader of a social organization, who – in turn 
– has a clientelist link to the party. 
 
In the interviewees’ experiences, responses and what I observed of their political lives, I was 
able to find three types of perception of, and response to, clientelist exchanges. In the pages that 
follow, I have selected what I consider to be emblematic cases that illustrate each of these three 
types. A first category of informants viewed clientelist relations as useful in a utilitarian sense. 
They participate in community and political activities because this gives them access to 
resources held, or brokered, by a local leader. Their perception of the political party to which the 
leader is linked depends on the quality of the goods and services she provides. A second category 
is made up of individuals with the economic means, education and/or organizational and political 
experience to have options beyond clientelistic ties. Correspondingly, they can permit 
themselves to take positions much more critical of clientelism. These people have been engaged 
in, or directly affected by, clientelism and recognize that it is used because of its short-term 
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benefits, but cannot reconcile it with their political values and vision for the country. The final 
category felt that clientelist relations go beyond simple utilitarian bargaining and involve 
important aspects of community building, such as teaching the value of political mobilization. 
These people tend to support the project of their patron even after they have received the tangible 
benefit that first motivated them to mobilize.  
 
In sum, the issue of clientelism is complex. Although it has a series of corrosive effects on 
society, it cannot be roundly dismissed as negative: the socioeconomically marginalized perceive 
clientelism to be a useful strategy for fulfilling basic needs and, in some cases, clientelism 
actually has positive effects on collective action and political involvement by giving poor 




Clientelism has been defined as a voluntary, dyadic arrangement in which two individuals of 
unequal status, who have a long-term personal relationship that may include elements of 
friendship and affection, engage in diffuse reciprocal exchanges of non-comparable goods and 
services to mutual benefit. The alliance is informal, but is governed by a set of norms based on 
reciprocity, integrity, honour, respect and obligation.ii The concept has been used to describe 
traditional relations between landlords and peasants or among villagers, links between politicians 
and the poor in modern societies and alliances among members of the middle class, elites, 
bureaucrats and politicians.iii 
 
To be sure, this is an inclusive definition, one whose elements have been the subject of fervent 
debates. In the early heyday of research on clientelism, undertaken from the 1950s to the 1970s 
and largely from a structural functional perspective, the most important of these included: 
whether and when dyadic relations are strictly instrumental or involve sincere sentiments 
between exchange partners; whether dyads exist only due to their importance to the social system 
that surrounds them or whether normative principles of reciprocity create obligations that must 
be fulfilled between people; whether dyads strictly involve individuals or whether groups can be 
considered; whether clientelism necessarily stunts political development or can be positive 
because it allows for the inclusion and mobility of the otherwise marginalized.iv 
 
More recent studies of clientelism are firmly grounded in very distinctive research traditions, 
whose foci on different entities of ontological importance also result in diverging views of 
clientelism. Sociologists and anthropologists, as well as political scientists with an affinity for 
the former disciplines, engaged in ethnographic studies tend to view clientelism as a highly 
dynamic relationship that can be effective across a variety of settings and is often used 
strategically by clients, as much as by patrons, to access scarce resources. Thus, Fox describes 
the differences between an ‘authoritarian clientelism’ where patrons firmly control political 
power and back clientelistic negotiations with credible threats of coercion to subjugate clients, 
and a ‘semiclientelism’ where patrons in a more competitive political environment can only 
threaten clients with benefit removal.v Gay recounts a community leader’s negotiations of one-
shot exchanges of votes for benefits with electoral candidates across a series of contests in terms 
of the community’s best alternative for ensuring political accountability.vi Shefner argues that 
independent community mobilization allows flexible material goal setting through organizing 
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mechanisms that may morph into broader political projects, but that clientelism is an important 
alternative if it provides easier access to resources.vii Harking back to earlier work on urbanviii 
and ruralix settings, these authors bring out the utilitarian aspects of relationships with patrons 
from a client’s perspective. 
 
Researchers writing from a rational-institutional perspective, on the other hand, tend to highlight 
the negative effects clientelism has on democratic institutions. For example, Brusco, Nazareno 
and Stokes describe clientelism as a system of social control that undermines democracy and 
motivates politicians to preserve economic stagnation so that they may continue to prey on the 
poor.x Kitschelt also argues that clientelism inhibits political freedom and participation while 
perpetuating economic inequality.xi More specifically, a number of authors hold that clientelism 
undermines (among other things) democratic legislative action, as legislators in clientelistic 
settings focus on delivering particularistic benefits rather than on generating policy to advance 
universal socioeconomic interests.xii 
 
Of course the authors concerned with clients’ needs and strategies recognize that clientelism 
generally undermines formal, impersonal, democratic institutions. However, they emphasize the 
problems created by gaps in the contemporary democratic, capitalist system. The latter is often 
imperfect in delivering goods and services to the poor, who therefore use personalistic tools to 
fulfill their material needs. Yet, as we will see, clientelism does not always undermine 
community organizing. The variability of clientelism is aptly demonstrated by the Mexican case: 
historically, in the shift from the PRI’s dominant rule to a competitive party environment, and 
presently, in the experiences of a number of clients in Mexico City. 
 
 
The Mexican Context 
 
The hegemonic PRI used clientelism as a mechanism of social control in both rural and urban 
arenas throughout the 71 years of its rule (1929-2000). In the post-revolutionary years, it 
bargained with local strongmen to ensure their loyalty, and that of their clients, thus patching 
over its uneven reach into the countryside. Although these strongmen had to deliver benefits to 
their clients in order to merit the position of patron, unjust treatment of clients was fairly 
widespread since possible patrons were in short supply and were subject to little oversight.xiii As 
economic modernization and the concomitant urbanization progressed, the PRI also began to use 
local strongmen to subjugate urban slums.xiv However, urban clients had access to a greater 
number of potential patrons, who not only had to compete for clients but also had to refrain from 
egregious exploitation since the party would not always tolerate this in the city, in sight of the 
general population. Thus, the affectivity and longevity of the traditional clientelist relationship 
diminished, while clients’ bargaining power increased.xv  The PRI itself always used both 
promises and threats in its clientelistic bargains. For example, dissidents of the regime were often 
offered lucrative bureaucratic positions in exchange for political quiescence, but failure to 
cooperate resulted in the application of force.xvi 
 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the PRI instituted a series of electoral reforms that resulted in its 
near upset by a coalition of left-wing opposition parties in the 1988 presidential elections.xvii The 
coalition was reconstituted as the PRD in 1989 and, along with other opposition parties, 
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increased its electoral activity and victories at the municipal and state levels. This rendered the 
political arena evermore competitive and culminated in the PRI’s loss of power to the 
conservative Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, PAN) in the year 2000. With the 
opposition contesting its every move and citizens becoming more openly critical, the PRI had 
less recourse to the stick it had used in the past to back its clientelistic bargains.xviii  
 
Despite their staunch opposition to priísta methods, perredistas also use clientelism to gather 
political support. However, they rarely employ force.xix Force is not only counter effective in the 
highly mediatized, politically competitive urban areas where the PRD is most successful, but has 
never formed an accepted element of clientelism in the party. The absence of force probably 
renders clientelism less efficient from the patron’s perspective – regardless of her party 
affiliation – but increases its attractiveness for clients. To be sure, clientelism continues to have 
non-democratic aspects, such as the discretionary distribution of public goods to clients. Those 
who do not have a patron or choose to forego such bargains go empty handed or must endure 
lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Nonetheless, perredistas’ privatization of public goods has gone 
hand-in-hand with the party’s attempts to improve the general socioeconomic and political 
situation of the marginalized. Nowhere is this more evident than in Mexico’s Federal District. 
 
The government of Mexico City has been held by the PRD since 1997 and was headed by 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador at the time of my investigation. López Obrador’s aim was to 
create a state of justice and equality in which the lower classes are given the opportunities, skills 
and resources – through programs providing access to education, work, health care, housing and 
good nutrition – to improve their standard of living.xx Local PRD politicians were continually 
campaigning for this project and the programs that had already been established were very 
popular among the poor.xxi 
 
In addition to using the popularity of the party’s platform, party politicians and operators actively 
sought to increase support among the poor through clientelist means. They negotiated with 
individuals and with leaders of social organizations to exchange goods and services for 
affiliation to the party, participation in rallies and demonstrations to support the party and Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador and/or their vote. Individuals received a variety of incentives, ranging 
from food baskets, eyeglasses and cinema passes, to the installation of street lamps and 
preferential treatment by social housing authorities. Where a social leader brokered the link 
between citizen and party, the leader was given resources that were then distributed 
discretionarily to organization members and the leader may even have negotiated a political 
position in return for convincing members to support the party. It is the perceptions of these 
interactions and the resulting longer-term responses to the party, its politicians and sociopolitical 
participation in general, that are analyzed here. 
 
Clientelism Effectively Satisfies Basic Needs 
 
Some of the urban poor interviewed view their clientelistic relationships from a very utilitarian 
perspective. They need food, shelter and work and would like to be able to educate their children 
so that they may have a better life, but cannot easily achieve their objectives through official 
channels. In order to meet their needs, they negotiate informal exchanges with persons who have 
some kind of privileged access to the required resources. They operate in a world marked by 
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clientelism with a heavy political content, but are not necessarily interested in the meaning of 
this politics beyond the role it plays in their alliance with a patron who provides goods and 
services.  
 
To be sure, the clients’ actions per se are political. First, their needs are not only individual but 
the direct result of socioeconomic structures that affect an entire segment of the population: the 
urban poor as a sector lack stable employment, adequate housing and access to public 
infrastructure. Second, filling their needs requires organization and interaction with individuals 
or groups in government, or at least with brokers who have access to the latter.xxii However, the 
political activity of urban slum dwellers is often motivated by an individualistic rationale and 
ceases when the goal triggering mobilization has been reached.xxiii  The activity is, thus, 
objectively political but subjectively personal. That is, the key for clients is the material aspect of 
the exchange relationship and the manoeuvring that is necessary to keep open the channels 
through which the resources flow. It does not necessarily matter to whom the channel leads – 
whether a conservative, centrist, or leftist politician – as long as that patron is competitive. 
Where clientelism unfolds in this way, there is a positive effect on clients’ perceptions of the 
party whose politicians engage in the negotiations, as long as the latter continue to be 
competitive patrons. 
 
The Unión Popular Benita Galeana.xxiv The Unión Popular Benita Galeana (UPBG) is a social 
organization founded by two PRD politicians to help residents of Mexico City with limited 
means to acquire subsidized housing. One of its projects involves a plot of land with an 
apartment complex, a house and several shanties, which are to be destroyed to make room for a 
new building to house the plot’s current inhabitants. The people all have to sign on to the project 
and make their down payment in a fixed time span in order for the government credit to be 
granted and construction to commence. There is some difficulty in this because not all of the 
inhabitants want to proceed with the UPBG as administrator. At a meeting of community leaders 
and the UPBG, it was revealed that 68 of the 154 families on the plot have organised an 
alternative group under the leadership of a politician from the Partido Verde Ecologista de 
México (Green Ecologist Party of Mexico, PVEM). The dissidents do not want to pay rent owing 
(some have not paid for 15 years) and complain that the UPBG group is politicized because of its 
founders’ involvement. If the protesters are not convinced to come aboard, the proposal will fail 
because the Instituto de Vivienda del Distrito Federal (Federal District Housing Institute, INVI) 
requires the unanimous consent of all tenants. Due to these issues, it is important that the 
project’s directorate include the tenant group’s natural leaders, who command respect and have 
the ability to sway opinions. Doña Antonia is one of these people and, although she is a 
rebellious character who does not make an ideal administrator, one UPBG leader says that, ‘she’s 
been here a long time and people look to her, so we have to pull her in.’ 
  
Doña Antonia is an older woman with little patience for the dissidents and openly admits that she 
will give them confrontational replies when they ask her questions, rather than attempting to 
explain why they should join her side. In fact, she is ready to become aggressive with these 
people and hints that she may bring a weapon to the next general meeting. Privately, she tells me 
that she is afraid the credit application and construction processes will be much too difficult and 
take too long. Doña Antonia has lived on this plot of land almost her entire life, in self-
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constructed stone and corrugated aluminium dwellings. Now she says that she has already lived 
her life; she just wants her house, her property.  
  
Always a priísta, Doña Antonia is becoming convinced of the merits of the PRD because she 
sees the good work of the party through the two politicians who founded the UPBG. She says 
that the PRI politicians talk a lot, but they never do anything and the PAN, which is in power in 
Doña Antonia’s municipality, is elitist: ‘they only pay attention to the middle class. They ignore 
the poor.’ The politicians involved in the UPBG, on the other hand, will rub shoulders with 
anyone and make an effort to ensure that the people have what they need. She first met one of 
them many years ago, when he began to come around with a truck to sell cheap food packages. 
She knows the second one better and thinks he is a very good person because he has worked hard 
for UPBG members. For example, she asked him to help her convince the municipality to have a 
light installed in the passageway that leads from the street to her slum dwelling, ‘and look, 
there’s the light. Of course, I pay for the electricity, but he had the lamp put up.’ 
  
Doña Antonia does not see the exchanges between the politicians, the UPBG and the tenants as 
political or of personal benefit to the politicians involved. ‘The [UPBG] does not ask us for 
anything, no quotas, nothing […] If anything, it’s the reverse. For example, [the politician] has 
helped many of the older women to get their birth certificates, which are necessary documents 
for the transactions with the INVI.’ The tenants will occasionally be asked by the association to 
do something in support of its founding politicians, or the two politicians will invite them to an 
event, but attendance is strictly voluntary. ‘No one is obligated to go to anything. When we go, 
then they just say, thanks a lot for coming and supporting us, companions.’  
  
A PRD activist who volunteers for the Unión clarifies that the two politicians have the Unión 
members to thank for their political positions. She says that many votes for the two candidates 
came from the organization and, in return, they contribute money from their salaries to pay for 
administrative costs and make sure that the INVI processes UPBG projects with due attention. 
For example, when the current development began, there was talk of the down payments for 
members being 30,000 pesos.xxv Negotiations with the INVI resulted in agreement to a much 
higher than usual amount of credit, leaving the members with a lesser, 15,000 peso, down 
payment. Smiling, the activist says, ‘it’s all a big circle’. 
 
Doña Antonia is not interested in using diplomacy to ensure the smooth functioning of her group, 
or in the opinions or needs of other members. Nor does she care about party platforms beyond 
noting the party adhesion of the politicians who have responded to, or ignored, her resource 
needs. Her actions are strictly circumscribed by individualistic goals. It is only in conversation 
with a party activist that the greater political repercussions of Doña Antonia’s participation, and 
that of other group members, are made explicit.   
  
Senior Citizens’ Groups. Some PRD politicians have used brokers to form groups for senior 
citizens in their electoral districts. One such broker introduces me to her Thursday evening 
group, where 13 women are in attendance. All of the women agree that they attend these 
meetings because they like to spend time together and share experiences, have fun, dance and 
exercise. When I ask about the PRD, one of the women says that they have nothing to do with 
the party here and the rest chime in, in a general ‘no’. Then Doña Gloria speaks. She rises from 
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her place in the circle of chairs and begins to walk about, gesturing with her arms and hands to 
underscore her point: she is with the PRD. Doña Gloria tells the group of López Obrador’s help 
to the elderly and everyone concurs that the Mayor is doing a good job. She goes on to describe 
the merits of the district’s federal congressman (PRD) and his wife, who attended her daughter’s 
funeral and wake and who provide her with food packages and eye glasses. Doña Gloria 
concludes, ‘the only way I can repay them is with my support, so if they ever need my help for 
anything, I’ll be there.’ She asks the others how they feel about this and yeses are heard around 
the room.  
 
Several weeks later, I join the broker and members of her groups at a demonstration against 
firearms, led by the congressman’s wife, who is a member of the Federal District’s Legislative 
Assembly for the PRD. Here, I meet Catalina, a 62-year-old widow who sits on the Board of 
Directors for the broker’s largest group, which comprises approximately 65 people. She was 
elected to this position by the group and her responsibilities include responding to members’ 
questions and concerns when the broker is not present, as well as making sure that everyone 
signs in at the beginning of a meeting. Her group is meeting as we speak and she forgot to sign in 
before joining the march, but she hopes this oversight will not have repercussions since the 
broker is also demonstrating and will know that Catalina participated. She explains that this is 
important since she will not be able to get her monthly food package from the municipality if she 
has not attended all of the meetings. Regular presence at gatherings also qualifies her for the 
municipality’s program of providing eye glasses to seniors, but if she chose this option, she 
would have to forego her food packages for one year. 
 
Before her husband died, Catalina and he spent 25 years selling tomatoes from a dolly in the 
market. She is no longer strong enough to do this work alone and is now supported by her 
family. While the municipality’s monthly food packages are only worth about 100 pesos, they 
contain the essentials: one kilo each of sugar, rice, beans and powdered milk, as well as salt, 
cooking oil, coffee, fresh milk, sardines, tuna, chiles and chocolate. Rounding this out with the 
meat and tortillas that she buys herself, the package does last her almost the entire month, taking 
some of the burden off her family. 
 
Her seniors’ group is important to Catalina not only due to the tangible benefits she receives as a 
result of attendance. Much like the Thursday assembly members indicated, Catalina also enjoys 
the others’ company. After her husband died, she became very depressed and refused to leave 
her house for a long time. Catalina says it took her family years to convince her to participate in 
something in order to get out of the house. Now, she is in the group, is happy once again, talks to 
everyone and especially enjoys the dances and exercise sessions. She admits that she does not go 
to many demonstrations because she does not like to walk long distances, but when she does 
participate it is because she wants to have fun, not for political reasons.  
 
Members of the seniors’ groups are motivated primarily by the desire to socialize as well as by 
the food baskets and health care available through participation. It is not of immediate 
importance to them that a political party sponsors the groups or that their activities with these 
groups have a political impact. Thus, Catalina demonstrates because it is a sunny day, she enjoys 
others’ company and because it lowers her family’s grocery expenses, not because she has any 
active interest in firearms legislation or in the PRD’s position on the matter. 
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A Partido del Trabajo Shanty-town. The pragmatic vision of personal exchange relations also 
exists among clients of other parties. In a shantytown organization administered by the Partido 
del Trabajo (Workers’ Party, PT), a number of members explain to me that they do not really 
know or care about the politics related to their activities. This organization has housing projects 
in eight Federal District municipalities and I am visiting the two projects closest to its 
headquarters. Both of the shanty towns I see were established as a result of land invasions – the 
members of the organization set up a camp on an unoccupied plot of land overnight and then 
began to build their homes. Due to the manner in which they take possession of property, these 
people are called  ‘paracaidistas’ (parachuters) in Mexican slang. Once they are on the land, 
they generally barricade and patrol it, so that law officials and non-members cannot enter to 
disturb their activities. While the leader of the project is a PT politician, the members are only 
there to meet their own needs. 
 
Dolores has been with the organization for over 20 years, living in various shantytowns. She and 
other members of the project go to demonstrations and sit-ins in minibuses, paid for either by the 
PT or by the settlers, when their leader tells them that such an event will take place. What 
happens if they do not attend these events? ‘They fine us,’ Dolores laughs, ‘no, no, it’s not true’. 
She explains, ‘we go for our thing, for economic reasons. The political side doesn’t interest us, 
we don’t know anything about it.’ Her friend chimes in, ‘[the leader] is the boss, we just show up 
to see what’s going to be done, what demonstration we have to go to. We’re just interested in 
housing, that’s why we’re with [the leader]. He’s the one who’s a politician.’ 
 
Adela, who lives on the second plot, confirms the other two women’s statements. She is a 27-
year-old mother of six, whose husband lives with her off and on.  
I have been here for four years. I like it here because it feels like 
a family atmosphere. I used to live with my parents-in-law, but I 
didn’t want that anymore because it doesn’t work … I go to 
demonstrations and sit-ins because it’s fun. I leave my kids with 
their grandparents, so I get to go without them and I can chat 
with other people – it’s relaxing, de-stressing, entertaining… We 
hear about the events at assemblies, where the settlers are told 
where and when to go.  I am saving for an apartment with the 
INVI because I want something more for my kids. 
 
These women are not interested in politics, but in having a place to live and finding security for 
their families. If they can improve their economic situation through an alliance with a political 
patron, they are happy to do so and do not see their participation in political events – even 
though they do not bother to inform themselves what these are for – as an undue burden. Adela, 
in fact, finds the political events to be a welcome change from her everyday activities. 
 
In sum, the women we have met so far participate in social organizations and construct 
relationships with politicians or their brokers for personal reasons. Through these connections, 
they gain significant benefits that can go a long way toward fulfilling their basic needs of food, 
shelter and human interaction. Though mobilization in general and their relationships with 
politicians of a particular ideological stripe have an important political content, the women do 
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not engage directly with the political aspect, relegating it to a level of secondary importance and 
regarding it through the lens of their personal relationship with the party representative. As long 
as their liaison with the latter has positive results, they will regard the party in question kindly. 
Miguel, however, views the link between the leaders of his association and the PRD skeptically. 
 
The Panteras. Miguel drives a taxi under the judicial protection of the amparos that have been 
granted to approximately 20 taxi associations whose drivers operate without legal permits in 
Mexico City.xxvi Unemployment here is high and taxi driving is one of the preferred jobs for 
those unable to find work elsewhere.xxvii Since it is time consuming and expensive to become 
legally licensed as a taxi driver, many drivers simply join one of the associations whose affiliates 
operate under an amparo conceding them the right to work. Known as pirates, these drivers thus 
continue to be illegally employed, but are supposedly beyond the reach of police. The largest 
such association is the Panteras (Panthers), operated by a radical popular movement and linked 
to the PRD through one of its leaders. The Panteras have somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 
members – a number difficult to pin down since it fluctuates constantly and leaders tend to 
inflate the size of their organization – and operate from 24 offices in the Federal District. They 
are considered the most militant direct action group of the popular movement because members 
are often sent to close important streets to traffic and clash with police to make known the 
presence of the movement and its position on political issues. 
 
Miguel has been driving with the Panteras for the past year and describes the organization as 
providing an important opportunity. 
With the Panteras, you buy the amparo for 3,500 pesos, pay a 
100 peso weekly quota, make sure your car is in good condition, 
buy your insurance and get your license. Official taxi plates cost 
about 80,000 pesos, so this is much more expensive than the 
amparo. Plus, if you have problems with the police, your leader 
promises to solve them. 
 
Miguel explains that the weekly quota is supposed to be a support for the services provided by 
leaders. These include paying for the return of impounded cars by bribing officials; paying off 
politicians to allow the pirates to operate; and ordering t-shirts and banners that will make the 
Panteras identifiable in pro-PRD demonstrations. Regarding the latter, Miguel says that he does 
not participate in these kinds of events as he is ‘not ok with playing the leaders’ game because 
they benefit personally […] they exploit people; their motive is to make themselves look strong 
and benefit by getting people together.’ He estimates that the leaders keep about 30% of the 
various quotas, enriching themselves and building mansions. The final destination of the fines 
Miguel has to pay for not attending political events is also not traceable, but he thinks it goes 
into the leaders’ pockets. 
  
Nonetheless, Miguel points out that many people are in agreement with the way in which the 
group operates. This is because the difficult employment situation in the city makes them 
dependent on organizations such as the Panteras for work. Relatively few are able to afford the 
official plates and wind up driving for someone else, paying the car’s owner a quota of 
approximately 200 pesos daily. The money they keep allows them to survive, but they will never 
have enough to buy their own plates. With the Panteras, on the other hand, they must buy the 
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amparo and pay the weekly quota, but their income is theirs to keep. Because the trade of 
official plates is lucrative, many drivers – including Miguel – will sell them, buy one or two cars 
with the profit and join the Panteras with a small fleet. This is not a safe business since the 
police harass the pirates, claiming that the amparo is no longer valid, but it is a worthwhile risk 
for people who have no other opportunities to build capital. Supporting these assertions, a 
reporter covering the Panteras, states that the drivers he has spoken with tend to regard their 
association positively. They usually tell him of their families’ economic need and how the 
association works to help them get ahead.xxviii 
  
Much like the women whose experiences are recounted above, Miguel participates in clientelist 
exchanges because they bring him personal benefits. Through the association he has joined, he is 
able to generate an income that is unattainable for him in the formal economy. However, he tries 
to pocket the benefits without fully complying with what is expected of him because he feels 
that the organization leaders abuse their position. Miguel does, thus, take into account the 
implications of organizing and knows that the Panteras leaders profit politically from their 
capacity to mobilize great numbers. This colours his view of the PRD and if a broker or 
politician offering a better deal than the Panteras came along, he would switch allegiance.  
 
From the perspective of the PRD, the approximately 18,000 taxis pirata operating in Mexico 
City are a sign of the difficulties involved in governing in a democratic era marked by great 
income inequalities.xxix Unlike the PRI in its hegemonic heyday, the PRD cannot afford to rule 
the city with an iron fist. The PRD in government has to respond to increasing pressures to deal 
with crime in the city, coming in particular from the middle and upper classes, hundreds of 
thousands of whom demonstrated to protest insecurity on June 27th, 2004. The piratas are 
perceived as a significant source of crime, not only because they operate illegally, but also 
because they are feared as potential robbers and kidnappers.xxx However, the PRD in government 
also has to represent the interests of its poor constituents, among them the piratas, who cannot 
find jobs with decent pay in the formal economy and have to turn to the informal sector. As a 
result, the city administration on the one hand fines piratas and impounds their vehicles and on 
the other hand grants them amparos so that they may continue to operate. In this context, some 
PRD politicians and city officials act as brokers between pirata organizations and the law. The 
politicians and officials form clientelistic alliances with pirata representatives, in an exchange 
that allows the former to build political capital and the latter to provide their members some 
security in their work.xxxi Regardless of the difficulties involved in governing Mexico City, 
educated citizens often judge the PRD’s methods and alliances harshly.  
 
Clientelism Manipulates and Demobilizes  
 
The second category of interviewee perceptions of, and responses to, clientelist relations is made 
up of individuals who are not entirely dependent on clientelism to reach their goals and who see 
clientelism as clashing with their worldview. These clients’ comments and experiences bear out 
the conclusions drawn by researchers studying the effects of clientelism on democratic 
institutions, that clientelism demobilizes citizens and individualizes their demand making, while 
providing incentives for politicians to privatize public goods.xxxii Of course, it is no accident that 
the only cases I found of individuals for whom the trade-offs of clientelism proved too 
inconvenient or insufficiently rewarding were not poor persons, but rather educated professionals 
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or community leaders with alternative opportunities. Their experiences with clientelism in the 
PRD have left them disappointed with a party that they had once considered to be a great hope 
for Mexico. 
 
Casa Lomas Social Housing Cooperative. Beatriz and her sister had already tried various 
unsuccessful approaches to buying an apartment, when they joined the Casa Lomas project, 
which is run by one of the city’s urban popular organizations. The banks asked for prerequisites 
they were unable to meet and other housing groups only wanted to steal from them. They even 
considered an organization run by a politician from the PAN, but Beatriz says this was worse 
than others because the leader showed no interest in creating a political environment in which the 
claimants’ general needs would be looked after. The sisters found their way into the Casa Lomas 
cooperative at the invitation of an aunt who had already been a member for some time and 
because they realized that, despite the work expected of them, this project would allow them to 
get ahead.  
  
Beatriz had to strike a bargain with the Casa Lomas leader in order to join the project. She says 
that everyone has to make a deal because, on top of paying the leaders ten pesos every week, one 
has to donate something to become a member. Being a psychologist, Beatriz was asked to give 
talks to others in the cooperative. The association uses the skills of those wanting to join to fill its 
needs: professionals have to volunteer their expertise and those who do not have any particular 
abilities make up the manual labour force and direct action groups (grupos de choque). The latter 
are those sent to protect land that has been invaded or to confront police in demonstrations. 
  
Other than volunteering her skills as a psychologist, Beatriz had to pay a deposit into a housing 
fund and attend weekly meetings of the organization as well as a variety of political protests and 
demonstrations. She explains that the movement that founded Casa Lomas has always had to 
protest to be recognized because it organises the poorest of the poor, but that it claimed not to be 
a political entity until it began to mobilize in favour of the PRD once the party won power in the 
Federal District. Then, when one of the movement leaders ran for election to the Legislative 
Assembly, everyone had to vote for him. ‘It really wore you down,’ Beatriz says of the 
requirements, but she carried on until she reached her goal. 
  
However, it was not unusual that members would avoid participating in events, or leave the 
organization altogether, because they tired of the incessant activities. At demonstrations,  
people go, look for the person who writes down that you were 
there and then leave. That’s what I did. But, if you don’t go at 
all, you have to pay a fine between 30 and 50 pesos. The idea is 
that you pay this so that they can pay someone else to go in your 
place, but they never end up giving that person the full amount. 
Those who collect the money keep some of it. But, none of this 
matters because as long as you don’t have a house, you do 
whatever they say to get it. And you say whatever it is they tell 
you to say: down with the PRI, down with the PAN. Once you 
already have a house, you stop going. The [movement] enslaves 




Beatriz sympathized with the left before becoming a member of Casa Lomas. She had many 
left-wing ideas and would participate in political events of her own accord. After her experience 
in the Casa Lomas association, however, she stopped doing all of this because she felt deceived. 
‘They [the cooperative and organization leaders] do have many leftist ideas, but it’s a 
manipulated left.’ Whatever political education the organization imparts is given to its leaders, 
who then pass it on to the membership in assemblies where accords are made and work is 
organised. Members of the rank and file who are interested in meeting procedures could learn 
something from the assemblies, but Beatriz doubts that there is an impact on the people in 
general. ‘People who are in there and who are leftists are going to do what the Front asks of you 
and more because you’re convinced, but many aren’t leftists and only do it because they have 
to.’ She speculates that, of the 500 Cooperative members, only 10 to 20 % were actually swayed 
by the Front’s ideas and activities and these people generally became representatives in the 
leadership commissions. 
  
Beatriz and her sister had reservations about exchange relations in which resources are traded 
for political support, but found that this was the only way they could get their own residential 
property. When they made the decision to enter a social housing claimants’ organization, they 
tried to choose one in which the requirements for participation in various meetings, 
demonstrations and payments were not too heavy to bear. Nonetheless, the process wore them 
down and made them feel used to such an extent that they came to regard their patron and the 
entire organization as crooks. This attitude encompasses the PRD. Since the patron and 
organization are allied with the party, Beatriz and her sister now think that the party itself – and 
the political left in general – is manipulative. They no longer see the benefits of the PRD 
platform and have stopped being politically active. 
 
Unión Popular Revolucionaria Emiliano Zapata. The Unión Popular Revolucionaria Emiliano 
Zapata (Emiliano Zapata Popular Revolutionary Union, UPREZ) is rooted in a number of 
popular settlements and was formally constituted in 1987, as an anti-electoral organization that 
refused to ally with any politician. In the 1988 presidential elections, the leaders and many 
members decided to support the coalition that later became the PRD, but did so on an individual 
and voluntary basis, rather than affiliating the organization as a whole. Since that time, the 
UPREZ has participated in various PRD electoral processes and currently boasts one federal 
deputy, one local deputy in Mexico State and two Legislative Assembly deputies in the Federal 
District. Rafael is one of the primary leaders of the UPREZ, but works with a faction of the 
organization that has remained politically independent. He is personally averse to clientelism and 
feels that exchange-based relationships between social movements and the PRD have done a 
disservice to society by demobilizing the politically independent organizations that tried to hold 
government accountable. 
In the organization right now we’re discussing clientelism in the 
PRD because the party uses the people’s demands for 
clientelistic purposes. We’ve fallen into these practices as well: 
many comrades lose their social objectives and use people to win 
campaigns. For example, we have a supplies project through 
which we buy produce directly from peasants as a long-term 
project to resolve the needs of families, but at election time some 
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people give out food baskets and this derails the project … To 
stop clientelism you have to structure the organization so that 
people are there voluntarily, not because they need housing or 
supplies. 
 
The PRD has broken our organizations and led to fractures 
within the organizations. It gets so that people have personal 
interests: they want to be representatives and have privileges 
rather than having projects … The problem is one of dynamics. 
Once people are in government, they become separated from the 
organizations because of the dynamics they’re put into in 
government … People who engage in clientelism and 
corporatism also often don’t have a real interest in the PRD. 
They only use it as a tool to get to power. 
 
However, Rafael’s lengthy experience in organizing the urban poor and in watching clientelism 
at work has also led him to the conclusion that clientelism can have counterintuitive effects in 
some instances. 
People may get together and form a group or join a group 
because they have a specific need, but, once in a group, they 
learn new things. Some don’t know how to read and write when 
they enter, but then they learn. Often, when they enter, they only 
see their own specific need, but within the group they learn to see 
the larger problematic – they come in seeing a tree and then learn 
to see the forest. Therefore, they might start out organizing as an 
administrative necessity, but end up learning about the benefits 
of organizing in general, as well as the skills it takes to organize. 
Therefore, you can’t say that clientelism destroys all natural 
forms of organization: it may actually create some. The bad thing 
is that some individuals use the organization to further their own 
interests.  
 
Clientelism Teaches Participatory Values 
 
As Rafael points out, some poor interviewees initiated clientelist links with social organization 
leaders or political brokers in order to fulfil personal needs, but learned from these relationships 
that they could help their community and thus become socially or politically engaged citizens. 
These people came to see the importance of the activities that are a required aspect of the 
exchange bargain. Many social organizations that are linked to the PRD base benefit distribution 
on members’ participation at association meetings, in research groups, at political rallies, at 
classes on the political process and so on. As described above, some clients do not put much 
thought into what goes on at such gatherings and others consider the process manipulative and 
anti-democratic. There are some, however, who came to see activism as personally fulfilling and 
important for society at large. These erstwhile clients responded to their experience of 
clientelism by making the patron’s projects their own and actively supporting the party – either 
directly or through the associations with which it is connected.  
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Asamblea de Barrios. The ‘Santa Clara’ faction is one of the remaining splinter groups of the 
Asamblea de Barrios (Neighbourhoods Assembly), an urban popular movement that was very 
powerful in the Federal District in the 1980s. Santa Clara was founded in 1983 with the objective 
of providing organizational aid and solidarity for social housing claimants in the neighbourhood. 
One of the architects working on the Santa Clara projects became a candidate for the PRD when 
it was founded in 1989. While he abandoned his direct work with the organization he has been 
very successful in the political arena and the Santa Clara Assembly came to benefit from his 
political patronage. One long-time militant in the urban popular movement and the party explains 
that the politician is friendly with the director of the INVI, through whom he ensures that Santa 
Clara developments are processed rapidly.  
  
To show me how the Santa Clara Assembly functions, its leader invites me to one of the 
meetings that take place every Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday. As I file into the meeting 
hall in a throng of Santa Clara members, I see people clustered around two areas. The first is a 
desk operated by three individuals helping Santa Clara members to fill out PRD affiliation forms. 
The second is a section of wall with group headings pasted on it. Under each heading people are 
signing in for the meeting to make sure that they receive attendance points. Points are given for 
participation in various types of events and those with the highest scores are placed on the top of 
the waiting list for new social housing units. Once we are seated in the front of the auditorium 
and the rows have almost filled, a woman from the PRD desk asks the leader to make sure 
everyone brings their electoral credentials to the next meeting because she cannot fill out the 
affiliation forms without these. 
  
When the meeting begins, I am struck by the variety of activities carried on by this organization. 
The environmental group makes a presentation on the water contamination problem in the 
Federal District, the women’s council showcases handicrafts that are made and sold by its 
members, a representative of each of the 14 commissions (health, press, judicial, etc.) notifies the 
crowd of recent business and a woman informs – to everyone’s delight – that she won 50 points 
toward her apartment for attending López Obrador’s recent march to the city centre. Finally, the 
leader rises to introduce me, explaining, 
she has the idea that the party gives us things and that it has 
opened all the doors for us, but this isn’t true, right? The party 
hasn’t done anything for us, right? Everything we have, we’ve 
gotten through our own work, right? Afterwards she’ll want to 
interview some of you, so you’ll tell her, right?  
 
He goes on to hold a lengthy speech about the value of participation and hard work and the need 
to support López Obrador, concluding with a call for a peaceful revolution through the vote. 
‘Speaking of this, our friend is outside doing party affiliations and she’ll be here on the weekend 
too. Even if you’re not convinced yet, affiliate anyway because we need your help.’ 
  
After the meeting, I speak with a man from the Transition Commission, a group of people being 
trained by the leader to run the organization in case he succeeds in one of his bids for political 
office. Iginio already has his apartment, but continues to work for the organization in order to 
help others facing the challenges caused by the Federal District’s housing shortage. The Santa 
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Clara Assembly provides its members with a support network and with organized activities 
teaching general knowledge and specific economic skills. For example, a women’s committee 
makes and sells crafts, adolescents are kept off the streets through structured activities and ill 
individuals receive financial aid. The Statistics Commission keeps track of who participates in 
the various activities, giving out points that are collected by claimants so that they may advance 
on the list of people to receive apartments and then on that of who chooses the best apartments. 
Iginio pronounces a slogan that I have heard from the leader as well as other members, ‘work 
and saving go together. Here, nothing is given for free.’ Iginio is grateful for the organization’s 
help. 
I have my house now. As I got ahead, I realized that others were 
getting the same thing I was. I realized that we were receiving 
something like a subsidy in terms of the help of the people in the 
organization. Now, I feel that I have to give something back. We 
have to keep the organization running for services and to help 
those who have even less than we. 
 
‘Suárez’ Housing Project. Like Iginio, Isabel - a divorced mother of two - is pleased with the 
organization that is representing her interests as a housing claimant. The venture Isabel is part of 
differs from the above projects in that she already owns an apartment in the centre of Mexico 
City. The 1985 earthquakes damaged her building’s structure, so that the various proprietors are 
applying for a government credit to destroy the existing structure and re-construct. They initially 
created a small independent association to negotiate the credit, but soon realized the difficulty of 
navigating the legal maze of requirements without prior experience in such matters. One of the 
members had heard that there was a PRD activist who managed housing developments and 
contacted him for help. When they asked him what he would charge for his services, he replied 
that there would be no direct fee, but that they could help him with their vote for the party. 
 
Isabel says that when one goes to the INVI, one is immediately struck by the difference in 
treatment of independent claimants versus those with representation. ‘When you get there, the 
first thing they ask you is whether you’re represented’ and if you are not, the authorities keep 
you waiting. ‘When we go to the INVI with [the party activist], he knows what our rights are. He 
makes the appointment for us and reviews the documents and they treat us better than when we 
go alone.’ Just because they have found someone to speak for them, does not mean that the 
applicants’ job is done. They have to attend weekly meetings with Jorge and participate in 
political events. 
The meetings revolve around the housing question and party 
things. For example, with the videoscandalsxxxiii, [the activist] 
explains to us what is going on. They’re giving you a kind of 
schooling, such as the habit of participating in something on a 
weekly basis. They are training us and manage us with points for 
participating. We go to the meetings and then you have to go to 
other events. Going to the meeting is worth one point and events 
depend on what the leaders give. Those with the highest points 
get to choose their apartment first. 
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Regardless, Isabel feels positive about her political activity: ‘I don’t feel manipulated because I 
do like to participate […] I like to learn and to understand what’s going on in politics […] I’ve 
learned a lot from [the activist].’ She describes her political involvement as a direct result of the 
realization that elected officials respond to popular mobilization. Eventually she affiliated with 
the PRD and she thinks she will continue to be politically active when her construction project is 
finished. Isabel says, ‘they didn’t force us to affiliate, but since we saw that they’ve been 
resolving problems for us, everyone wanted to affiliate.’ Then she admits that she is not sure 
whether everyone did affiliate and that there are a few group members who invent excuses so 
that they will not have to participate as much. 
 
Iginio and Isabel were motivated to organize by personal problems but learned to appreciate, and 
to continue working for, the community. Iginio is linked to the PRD indirectly through a broker – 
his organization leader – with whom he has had a clientelistic relationship and who, in turn, has a 
clientelistic link with a party personage. Isabel’s link to the party is direct, since her clientelist 
relationship with the activist is not brokered by a third person. Through what has been required 
of them in these exchange relations, both individuals have learned about the responsibilities of 
citizenship and have taken these on as their own. Some clients will, thus, not only judge their 
patron and his party based on the selective incentives they receive, but will also use their 





The Mexican case demonstrates clientelism’s dynamic nature. In the gradual shift from the PRI’s 
hegemonic rule to a politically competitive context with uncertain electoral outcomes, 
clientelism has changed. It was initially used by the PRI to provide enough incentives to the 
socioeconomically marginalized sectors (and to political dissidents) to ensure their subjugation 
and was backed by credible threats of force. Should clients not accept the offered carrot, the stick 
would be used to impose compliance. With political opening, the use of the stick became less 
viable and clients gained in freedom. Since the democratic transition, patrons must compete 
vigorously for clients who can now choose among candidates from various parties. In the PRD, 
clientelism has gone hand-in-hand with an ideological project to improve the living conditions 
and political influence of the poor. Although some clients of perredistas have become politically 
cynical and demobilized as a result of their experiences, others report the opposite effect. 
 
Since clientelism has traditionally been a method of social control used by authoritarian elites the 
world over to ensure political stability, we tend to equate it with non-democratic politics. My 
evidence confirms the findings of researchers highly critical of clientelism: patron-client 
relationships are exclusionary and they can, and do, sometimes undermine grassroots 
organization and mobilization.  
 
Yet, clientelism is a highly dynamic form of exchanging goods and services that also performs 
well in competitive political contexts. In such an environment, clientelism can provide greater 
political transparency and accountability to the urban poor than the impersonal institutions 
formally associated with democratic government. Güneş-Ayata argues that a representative 
democracy provides citizens little personal contact with elected officials. xxxiv  Citizens feel 
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alienated by complicated and impersonal bureaucratic procedures and do not know whom to 
address to discuss their needs, or feel uncomfortable doing so with strangers. Shefner adds that 
the urban poor may not highly value highly abstract democratic ideals that do not have a visible 
impact on their resource needs. xxxv  Under competitive clientelism, however, clients have 
significant direct negotiating powers because patrons make their bids in the client’s presence and 
must outperform each other. Patrons are easily identifiable, easily held accountable and the rules 
of the game are clear.xxxvi My evidence also shows that clientelism builds, in some cases, the 
participatory skills and values that are the building blocks of democracy.  
 
The evidence of demobilizing and mobilizing effects is an indication that clientelism is a highly 
complex phenomenon. A series of contextual factors – including degree of political competition 
and scarcity of resources – determine the internal meaning associated with, and the socio-
political consequences of, clientelistic bargains. Although non- (or anti-) democratic 
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